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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-M-227
20 September 1979

Minutes
Two Hundred and Twenty-fifth Meeting
Wednesday, 19 September 1979, 1000-1230 Hours
Room 6E13, Langley Headquarters Building

Robert W. Gambino
Chairman
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert B. Finzel, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Department of the Army
[redacted], Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice
Mr. Dennis Southern, Department of the Treasury
Mr. Richard Welch, Department of the Navy

ALTERNATES PRESENT

Mr. David Humphrey, Department of Treasury
LTC Ernest Petersen, Department of the Air Force
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles Torpey, Department of the Air Force
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency

ALSO PRESENT

[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert B. Cameron, Department of the Navy
[redacted] onal Security Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

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[redacted] National Security Agency

Mr. Henry Kemp, Department of State

Mr. A. Clarke Magruder, Department of the Navy

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[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. William H. Randolph, Department of Commerce

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[redacted] National Security Agency

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] National Security Agency

Mr. Richard Solan, Department of the Treasury (Secret Service)

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[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

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[redacted] Executive Secretary, Security Committee

[redacted]

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PRELIMINARY COMMENTS

1. At the Chairman's request, [] brought members up to date on the proposed APEX system. [] noted that the APEX concept had changed significantly from its original form, and that the current proposal was scheduled for NFIB discussion on September 25. He described its proposed treatment of product and operational data, and said that if APEX was acceptable to NFIB, it was proposed for gradual implementation over a period of years with costs to be budgeted incrementally. [] then summarized administrative features of the current plan, and noted that SECOM would probably have a role to play in the system. []

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2. The Chairman noted that members had been provided copies of a SECOM policy statement on exchange of SCI denials information, and of a suggested change thereto by the CIA member. The change will be coordinated and members advised of the results at a later meeting. []

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3. The Chairman advised that [] of the SECOM staff was being transferred. He introduced [] as his successor, and [] as the new chairman of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee vice [] reassigned. []

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4. The Chairman invited members attention to the proposed revision of the Committee's charter, DCID 1/11, and said that the importance of this document was such that Committee Principals should give it their personal attention. []

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ITEM 1: Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 15 August 1979 meeting were approved as submitted. []

ITEM 2: Subcommittee and Working Group Chairmen Reports

a. Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations - [] advised that the [] leak investigation was still open with no apparent significant progress made. He said efforts were underway to sanitize documents for prosecutive use in the [] case. He noted that Justice was considering an NSA request []

[] Mr. Gambino described the status of efforts to establish a US Government position on action which could be taken regarding means of recovering copies of currently classified documents held by private persons. Mr. Gambino also noted that Justice Department had prepared and submitted to the NSC a study of alternate proposals for legislation to deal with unauthorized disclosures. Copies will be provided to members. [] was asked to serve as the SECOM point of contact on any follow-up action. []

b. Investigative Standards - [] speaking for [], said they hoped to complete a report on the analysis of DCID 1/14 investigative results in about a month. Mr. Gambino urged expeditious action, noting that this effort had been underway for some time. []

c. Security Awareness - Mr. Gambino noted that [] working group had done an excellent job in responding to tasking to develop a security briefing for senior officials and to produce a shorter version of NSA's videotape briefing on telephone security ("No Private Lines"). [] advised that they were showing the senior officials brief to Committee members to determine its suitability for Community use. The briefing, a slide-tape presentation incorporating the "No Private Lines" videotape, lasted for 20 minutes. It dealt succinctly and clearly with telephone security, protection

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of sources and methods, unauthorized disclosures and dealings with the press on sensitive topics, hostile intelligence threats, and overseas travel. [] said the approach they used was a suggested one which could be modified by other briefers to meet agency needs and circumstances. He advised that their proposed security briefing for persons without national security backgrounds (e.g., Justice attorneys dealing with espionage cases) was well along to completion and would soon be available to show to Committee members.

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ITEM 3: Technical Threat Briefing

Mr. Gambino advised that he had asked the R&D Subcommittee to brief members on hostile technical threats, in response to a request from the Army member for such data so that Community agencies could structure their countermeasures to a best judgment of reality. [] R&D Subcommittee chairman, noted that they had been preparing threat studies for about 5 years. He said the briefing would not address physical security threats. He introduced Mr. Richard Solan, the Secret Service member of the subcommittee, to give the briefing (details classified Secret/No Foreign Dissem). Mr. Solan advised that they approached threat assessments from a Community standpoint to optimize results and minimize costs. He said they focused on what has been found illustrative of threats, what is the state of technology governing threat parameters, what techniques are known to be in use, and what does intelligence reporting show or suggest about hostile activities.

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[] He advised that the subcommittee had published 11 threat assessments, each dealing with a specific technical area. He showed charts listing technical surveillance devices in terms of their estimated lifespans, limitations on their use, and a 5-year projection showing anticipated changes in threat potential. He noted that the subcommittee had prepared a security vulnerability handbook for use in site surveys. []

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In subsequent discussion it was noted that data prepared by the R&D Subcommittee on technical threats would be useful to Community agencies in preparing in-house budgets for technical surveillance countermeasure resources. In response to a question, Mr. Solan advised that R&D programs were underway in many areas to develop countermeasures against new or advancing technologies. [REDACTED]

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ITEM 4: Briefing on Emergency Destruction

Mr. Gambino advised that Navy had been asked to brief the Committee on this subject as a result of concerns expressed about it at the April meeting. Mr. Robert Cameron, the briefer, noted that the Navy's Anti-Compromise Emergency Destruction (ACED) program began in 1969 in the aftermath of the loss of the PUEBLO. The objective was to develop means of destroying classified information in varying media under emergency situations. He listed methods being explored to destroy data in paper, film, magnetic recording, or electronic equipment form. Mr. Cameron advised that the Navy had been made responsible for this subject for the entire Defense Department, and that they were now establishing firm requirements against which equipment and techniques would be developed and made available to ships, aircraft and land installations with a need (combatant units are excluded). Mr. Gambino asked if Navy could take cognizance of CIA and State requirements during this process. Mr. Welch said they would share their R&D results with other agencies, and strive to work with them on equipment applications.

[REDACTED] commented that existing drum devices for emergency destruction were sometimes unreliable or unavailable. Mr. Gambino suggested that there would be interest in non-alerting means of destruction (e.g., means which would not generate smoke) and to the fact that under emergency conditions electrical power might not be available. [REDACTED]

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ITEM 6: New Business

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a. [] advised that the thorough DIA review of security procedures following the [] case had established that supervisors and co-workers often knew of but did not report incidents of security concern about fellow personnel. Efforts will be made to increase employee consciousness of the need to report such matters. []

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
b. [] suggested that the Committee might wish to arrange a review of varying secrecy agreements, security acknowledgements and indoctrination statements with a view towards possible uniformity. Mr. Gambino noted that previous efforts had not been successful. Mr. Rubino advised that Department of Justice attorneys were currently reviewing the various forms of agreements used by Community agencies. Mr. Gambino asked him to obtain and provide details on the scope of the Justice review. []

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ITEM 7: Next Meeting

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Mr. Gambino advised that he was tentatively setting the next meeting for October 24. He noted that he would be out of town that date, and that details on the meeting would be provided later. []



Executive Secretary

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-653

19 SEP 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM: SECOM Staff

SUBJECT: 1980 Olympics and Soviet Security ☐

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An NFAC/Office of Current Operations intelligence brief of 18 September 1979 is quoted below for the information of SECOM members:



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Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000200160017-6

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-

27 September 1979

STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
DD/P&M

STATINTL FROM: [REDACTED]
DD/CA

SUBJECT: SCI Data Base

STATINTL 1. [REDACTED] Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation requested that a data base line of the numbers (not individual identities) of holders of all Special Access Programs as of the end of September 1979 be prepared. This to include separate accountings for government and industry.

2. The purpose of such a [REDACTED] run would be to serve as a base line of numbers of holders of SCI tickets against which numbers of holders of SCI access approvals could be compared intermittently (probably every 6 months) as the APEX proposal is implemented.

STATINTL

3. It would be appreciated if the necessary tasking of CIB would be made.

STATINTL 4. I will be pleased to provide any necessary additional information or to get the needed information from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATINTL

Chrono
RT:ns 27 Sep 79

STATINTL

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